If we follow the classical view with respect to man, then the term "man" (or "human being") is a universal, because this term then refers to a plurality of similar, and qua Essence even identical individuals, or the term refers to that Essence (which is the same in all individuals), but then the term is in fact also a universal, because the term still refers to a plurality. If the term "man" refers to the Essence of Socrates (or of Plato, Peter, etc., that is, of Socrates-for-example), then it refers to the one Essence of Socrates, and thus (in the new terminology) to the dynamical law of Socrates-for-example.
If, on the other hand, we suppose that every human individual is a different substance (in the metaphysical sense) also with respect to (specific) content (that is, not only as individuals), and thus each for themselves possessing a dynamical law of their own which differs in content from other dynamical laws (possessed by other human individuals), then the term "man", when we do not predicate it of Socrates only, but also of Plato, Peter, etc., refers also to a plurality of beings, which, however, in this case differ in Essence. This term "man" then is a universal in a stronger sense than in the classical case. Moreover, the term then does not refer to the Essence, but to a collection of similar Essences.