That which in the present exposition is called 'science', is deductive natural science. What we today mean by (natural) science (as contrasted with philosophy) is : empirical natural science (for instance physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, geology).
So in fact deductive natural science (not considering the science of cultures) is prior to (in the sense of analytically 'before') empirical natural science.
To the empirical part of science belongs the finding (via sense perception) of the an est (that is, whether something exists).
What, however, precisely is B e i n g (thus not the an est, but the 'est'), is treated by metaphysics (proper).
'Being' is analytically the first concept(ion).
The deductive science at issue here is in fact l o g i c with metaphysical presuppositions (such as the Species-Individuum Structure [previous document] ).
We may call all this 'epistemology'.
And in the metaphysical considerations logical issues must always be included :
Firstly, in order to investigate whether, and to what extent, logic is based on metaphysical presuppositions.
Secondly, in order not to attribute, just like that, that which belongs to our way of thinking, to the beings that are not produced by that thinking (and vice versa).