In a previous note ( NOTE 210 ) (about propositions given earlier) I suggested it to be the other way around. For the time being I let matters remain in this aporematic state.
The problem (but not its solution) can, in a preliminary way, be summarized as follows :
In the context of Thomistic philosophy we can say of the proposition :
the white (thing) is a colored thing
( = the thing, which is white, is a thing which is colored ),
that it mentions the subject and connotes the accident. We have here a proposition consisting of concrete terms.
Of its abstract counterpart, namely the proposition
whiteness is a color,
we can say that the accident is mentioned and (with St Thomas, not with Ockham) that the subject is connoted.
The note given earlier, namely NOTE 209 with the Summa quotation, might demonstrate that both predications are in fact equivalent. However, this should be further investigated.