Although there is some sort of parallelism between patterns of thinking and corresponding patterns in extramental reality, it would go too far to suppose this parallelism to be an isomorphy, that is, a precise correspondence between the parts of such a thinking pattern on the one hand, and corresponding parts of the extramental pattern on the other. To give a crude example : the concept ' red ' is not itself red. Red is a certain structural complex in extramental reality, and is intended by the concept ' red ' (and spoken with the word red ), but the concept is not itself expected to be identical or similar to this extramental structure. The concept (and the same goes for propositions and arguments intending extramental structures) is at most of comparable complexity with respect to the corresponding extramental structure. The concept (as are propositions and arguments intending extramental structures) is just a sign, a natural sign, and as such is different from that what it signifies.
Press BACK button of browser to return to NOTE 218.